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Abstract Consider n individuals who, by popular vote, choose among q ≥ 2 alternatives,
one of which is “better” than the others. Assume that each individual votes independently at
random, and that the probability of voting for the better alternative is larger than the probability
of voting for any other. It follows from the law of large numbers that a plurality vote among
the n individuals would result in the correct outcome, with probability approaching one
exponentially quickly as n → ∞. Our interest in this article is in a variant of the process
above where, after forming their initial opinions, the voters update their decisions based on
some interaction with their neighbors in a social network. Our main example is “majority
dynamics”, in which each voter adopts the most popular opinion among its friends. The
interaction repeats for some number of rounds and is then followed by a population-wide
plurality vote. The question we tackle is that of “efficient aggregation of information”: in
which cases is the better alternative chosen with probability approaching one as n → ∞?
Conversely, for which sequences of growing graphs does aggregation fail, so that the wrong
alternative gets chosen with probability bounded away from zero? We construct a family
of examples in which interaction prevents efficient aggregation of information, and give
a condition on the social network which ensures that aggregation occurs. For the case of
majority dynamics we also investigate the question of unanimity in the limit. In particular,
if the voters’ social network is an expander graph, we show that if the initial population is
sufficiently biased towards a particular alternative then that alternative will eventually become
the unanimous preference of the entire population.
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1 Introduction
The mathematical study of voting systems began as early as 1785, when the Marquis de
Condorcet [5] observed what is essentially a special case of the weak law of large numbers:
suppose there is a large population of voters, and each one independently votes “correctly”
with probability p > 1/2. Then as the population size grows, the probability that the outcome
of a majority vote is “correct” converges to one. Thus, information is “efficiently aggregated”.
In this work, we study a simple model of voter interaction, in which voters choose an
independent random opinion initially, but then modify that opinion iteratively based on what
their friends think. Thus correlation between votes is introduced “naturally,” through inter-
action. Our main example of interaction is majority dynamics, where at each round each
voter adopts the opinion of the majority of its neighbors. The basic question that we address
is that of efficient information aggregation: for which modes of interaction is information
aggregated efficiently, and for which is it not?
Additionally, we study some conditions for the achievement of unanimity when the graph
of social ties is an expander and agents use majority dynamics.
1.1 Model
We consider an election in which a finite set V of voters must choose between q ≥ 2
alternatives, which we will take to be the elements of [q] = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. The voters
are connected by an undirected social network graph G = (V, E). Denote the neighbors of
v ∈ V by Nv .
Each voter v ∈ V will be initialized with a preference Xv(0) ∈ [q], picked independently
from a distribution P over [q].
At time t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, v will update her opinion to Xv(t) based on her friends’ opinions
at times t − 1 and earlier. At time T , an election will take place and a winner Y will be
declared. Note that Y is a deterministic function of the initial votes (Xv(0))v∈V .
A simple and important example is majority dynamics where q = 2: At each iteration
of the dynamics, each individual v sets her vote to equal the most popular vote among her
neighbors in the previous iteration (we elaborate below on the handling of ties).
Xv(t) = argmaxa∈{0,1} |{w|Xw(t − 1) = a, w ∈ Nv}| .
At some large time T an election by plurality takes place, so that the winner is
Y = argmaxa∈{0,1} |{v|Xv(T ) = a}| .
Note that the majority rule (or more generally the plurality rule, in the case of more
than two alternatives) is fair and monotone: it is fair in the sense that is does not, as an
election system, treat one alternative differently than another; it is invariant to a renaming
of the alternatives. It is monotone in the sense that having extra supporters cannot hurt an
alternative’s case.
As a generalization of majority dynamics, we allow any updating of opinions and any
election system, provided that they are fair and monotone. For example, an individual may
give more weight to some of her friends than to others, and the final election could be an
Electoral College system. In Sect. 6 we further relax the fairness condition.
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1.2 Overview of the results
1.2.1 Social types
Our study of information aggregation will utilize the idea of social type: we divide the voters
V into a partition A of social types, and ask that any two voters of the same social type play
the same role in the election process. More precisely we require that if the labels are removed
from all individuals then it is impossible to tell apart two individuals of the same social type.
This shall be rigorously defined in Sect. 2.
In the case of majority dynamics, social types are induced by the automorphisms1 of the
graph G: u, w ∈ V are of the same social type if there exists an automorphism τ of G such
that τ(u) = w. Intuitively, this means that in an unlabeled drawing of G it is impossible to
say which is u and which is w; u and w are of the same social type if they play the same role
in the geometry of G, and hence play the same role in the election process. A graph in which
all vertices are of the same social type is called transitive.
1.2.2 Aggregation of information
Without loss of generality, we will assume that alternative 0 is the best alternative, and that
the initial opinion of each voter is slightly biased towards alternative 0: we take Xv(0) to be
a multinomial random variable such that P(Xv(0) = 0) > P(Xv(0) = j) for any j = 0.
Although this bias could be very small, the law of large numbers guarantees that with
enough voters, the outcome of a plurality vote at time 0 would choose the correct alternative,
except with exponentially low probability. We refer to this property as efficient aggregation
of information.
In Sect. 4, we ask whether information is still efficiently aggregated if we hold the vote at
time T instead, after allowing the agents to interact. One of our main results (stated formally
in Theorem 4.1 below for the general case of monotone dynamics and in Theorem 2.1 for the
special case of majority dynamics) is that information is efficiently aggregated when each
social type has many members. In particular, we show that the probability of choosing the
correct alternative approaches one as the size of the smallest social type approaches infinity,
with a polynomial dependence.
This implies that in majority dynamics on a transitive graph, in which case all voters are
of the same social type, the outcome of the final vote will be zero, except with probability
that decreases polynomially with the number of voters.
1.2.3 Lack of aggregation
Perhaps surprisingly, aggregation may fail when the condition requiring increasing size of
each social type is not met. Indeed, in Sect. 4.1 we provide an example with q = 2 alternatives,
majority dynamics and a final majority vote, which results in the wrong outcome, with
constant probability regardless of the size of the population.
An example given by Berger [4] can also be used for this purpose. We give our example
since we feel that it is simpler and gives additional intuition as to why aggregation may fail.
1 An automorphism of a graph G = (V, E) is a bijection h : V → V such that (v, u) ∈ E ↔ (h(v), h(u)) ∈ E
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1.2.4 Wider agreement, unanimity and expanders
In Sect. 6, we ask when, following T periods of interaction, a large part of the population is
in agreement.
Focusing on the case q = 2 and majority dynamics, we show that the proportion of the
population that votes for alternative zero at time T is at least as large as the initial bias towards
alternative zero.
We push the agreement threshold to its extreme in Sect. 7, where we show that if the
social network is an expander graph, the mode of interaction is based on plurality, and there
is enough initial bias, then eventually the entire population will agree on alternative zero.
1.3 Related work
Our work is closely related to work of Kalai [16] who studies social choice using tools
of discrete Fourier analysis. Kalai proves that any binary unbiased and monotone election
system aggregates information efficiently, given that all the voters have low influence on the
outcome.
Our work expands on this work in several directions: first, we elucidate the role of voters
types in this setup by showing that having large number of voters of each type implies aggre-
gation and that without this condition aggregation may not occur. Second, we go beyond the
binary world and explore general outcome spaces. Finally the questions of higher thresholds
and unanimity were not considered before.
Kanoria and Montanari [18] study majority dynamics with two alternatives on regular
(infinite) tree graphs, giving conditions which lead to convergence to unanimity. Their work
can also be interpreted as a study of a zero temperature spin glasses, a model also studied by
Howard [13] on 3-regular trees and Fontes et al. [8] on Zd .
Berger [4] gives an example of a series of graphs in which majority dynamics results in
the adoption, by all individuals, of the opinion of the individuals in a constant size group,
provided they all agree. Thus these graphs could serve in place of our example (Sect. 4.1),
showing how aggregation fails when there is a small social type. We provide our example
for completeness, and because it is somewhat simpler.
Our work is related to the widely studied family of Gossip-based protocols on networks
(see, e.g., Bawa et al. [3], Kempe et al. [19], and a survey by Shah [25]). The goal there is
to design and/or analyze distributed, repeated algorithms for the aggregation of information
on networks. For example, in the classical DeGroot model [6] agents “vote” with a real
number, which they calculate at each iteration by averaging the votes of their neighbors
from the previous iteration. The agents all converge to the same number, which is a good
approximation of the average of the initial votes only if degrees are low [11], or if, indeed, the
size of the smallest social type is large. This model is fairly easy to analyze, since the votes in
each iteration are a linear function of the votes in the previous iteration. Majority dynamics
is a natural discretization of this process, but has proven to be more resistant to analysis.
Indeed the non-linearity of the dynamics results not only in major technical challenges but
also in different behaviors of the two models.
Another related strain of models is that of Bayesian learning. Here the agents optimize their
votes to those which are the most likely to be correct, given a prior over correct alternatives,
an initial private signal and the votes of their neighbors in previous rounds (see, e.g., [2,22]).
Perhaps surprisingly, this dynamic is not necessarily monotone and therefore its analysis
requires different tools. The agents’ calculations there are more complicated, and hence
more difficult to analyze. On the other hand, the optimality of the agents’ actions makes
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the model amenable to martingale arguments, which don’t apply in the case of majority
dynamics.
Our main proof uses tools from the field of Fourier analysis of Boolean functions on the
discrete hypercube. In particular we use and extend results of Kahn, Kalai and Linial [14],
Friedgut and Kalai [9], a strong version of the KKL theorem by Talagrand [26] and a recent
generalization by Kalai and Mossel [17].
2 Definitions and results
We begin this section by defining the well known model of majority dynamics on social
networks, and state our main result (Theorem 2.1) for this model. We then generalize the
model to monotone dynamics, and restate our main result (Theorem 4.1) in this generality.
Note that Theorem 2.1 is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.1, since majority dynamics
are a special case of monotone dynamics.
2.1 Majority dynamics
Let V be a finite set of individuals. Let G = (V, E), an undirected finite graph, represent the
network of social connections of V . We denote the neighbors of v ∈ V by Nv . We allow G
to contain self-loops, so that v may or may not belong to Nv .
Let Xv(t) ∈ {0, 1} denote v’s vote at time t ∈ {0, . . . , T }. Let each Xv(0) be chosen from
some distribution P over {0, 1}, independently and identically for all v ∈ V . Note that once
the initial votes (Xv(0))v∈V are chosen, the process is deterministic.
At times t > 0, v updates its vote to equal the majority opinion of its neighbors in the
previous round. If the number of neighbors is even then we either add or remove v itself to
the set of neighbors Nv , to avoid ties.
Xv(t) = argmaxa∈{0,1} |{w|Xw(t − 1) = a, w ∈ Nv}| .
After some number of rounds T an election by majority takes place. We denote the winner
by YT :
YT = argmaxa∈{0,1} |{v|Xv(T ) = a}| .
To avoid ties in the final election, we assume |V | is odd.
We next define social types. Recall that τ : V → V is a graph automorphism of G =
(V, E) if (u, v) ∈ E ↔ (τ (u), τ (v)) ∈ E . We say that u and v are of the same social type
if there exists a graph automorphism that maps u to v. Informally, this means that u and v
play the same role in the geometry of the graph; it is impossible to tell which is which if the
labels are removed from the vertices. It is easy to see that “being of the same social type”
is an equivalence relation. We denote by A(G) the partition of the vertices of G into social
types. We denote by m(G) the size of the smallest social type:
m(G) = min
A∈A(G) |A|.
Our main result in this section is that information is aggregated efficiently, provided that
each social type has many members. To state our result, we first define the efficiency of an
aggregation procedure. Let Pδ be the probability distribution on {0, 1} such that Pδ(0) =
1
2 (1 + δ) and Pδ(1) = 12 (1 − δ). Then the efficiency μδ(G, T ) of majority dynamics on G
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up to time T is
μδ(G, T ) = Pδ[YT = 0].
Note that in a slight abuse of notation we use Pδ to denote both the distribution over {0, 1}
from which Xv(0) is chosen, and the measure on (Xv(t))v∈V,1≤t≤T and YT which is induced
by Pδ .
Our main result for this section is the following:
Theorem 2.1 There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that for any graph G
μδ(G, T ) ≥ 1 − C exp
(
−C δ log m(G)
log(1/δ)
)
.
In particular, μδ(G) approaches one as m(G) tends to infinity. Note that the bound does
not depend on T . This theorem is a special case of Theorem 4.1, which is stated below.
In the other direction, we provide an example showing what can go wrong when m(Gn)
does not grow to infinity.
Theorem 2.2 For any δ > 0, there exists a sequence of graphs Gn, whose sizes converge to
infinity, such that
sup
n
sup
T≥1
μδ(Gn, T ) < 1.
That is, there is some  > 0 such that for any n and T the probability of choosing the
wrong alternative is at least .
2.2 Monotone dynamics
In this section we extend the definitions and results of the previous section to a large class of
update rules and election systems, and a choice between more than two alternatives.
Let [q] = {0, 1, . . . , q −1} be the set of alternatives. The initial votes Xv(0) are, as above,
chosen i.i.d. from some P, which is now a distribution over [q]. As before, the process is
deterministic once the initial votes are chosen.
Let the history of v’s neighborhood before time t be denoted by Hv(t) = (Xw(s))s<t,w∈Nv .
Then [q][t]×Nv is the set of possible histories of the neighborhood of v before time t .
For each a ∈ [q] and k ∈ N we define a relation ≥a on [q]k as follows. Let x, x ′ ∈ [q]k .
We write x ′ ≥a x if, for all i ∈ [k] it holds that
x ′i = xi → x ′i = a.
Alternatively, if a vector of votes x is changed to x ′ such that x ′ ≥a x , then for each i either
xi is unchanged, or it is changed to a. Note that when q = 2 then x ′ ≥1 x reduces to the
usual x ′ ≥ x , i.e., x ′i ≥ xi for i ∈ [k].
For 0 < t ≤ T , let Xv(t) be determined as follows. Let the mode of interaction be a
collection of functions mv,t : [q][t]×Nv → [q], with
Xv(t) = mv,t (Hv,t ).
These functions are generalization of the majority function used in majority dynamics. As
such, we require that they meet the following conditions:
1. They are fair, or symmetric with respect to the alternatives: for all permutations σ on
[q] and all histories h ∈ [q][t]×Nv , σ (mv,t (h)) = mv,t (σ (h)), where σ(h) is the result
of applying σ to each element of h.
123
414 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst (2014) 28:408–429
2. They are monotone: for every pair h, h′ ∈ [q][t]×Nv , if mv,t (h) = a and h′ ≥a h then
mv,t (h′) = a.
An example would be majority dynamics, i.e., the case where q = 2, |Nv| is odd for all v,
and mv,t is equal to the most popular opinion among Xw(t − 1), where w ∈ Nv . A different
simple example is the case that Xv(t) is simply equal to Xv(t −1), unless all of v’s neighbors
agree in time t − 1 on some alternative a, in which case Xv(t) = a. That is, the agents do
not change their opinions unless their friends unanimously agree on a different opinion.
Following T rounds of interaction, we apply an election system function g : [q]V → [q]
to (X1(T ), . . . , X |V |(T )), to determine the chosen alternative Y :
Y = g(X1(T ), . . . , X |V |(T )).
This is again a generalization of a majority vote, and as such we require that g satisfy the
same fairness and monotonicity properties:
1. It is fair, or symmetric with respect to the alternatives: for all permutations σ on
[q], σ (g(a)) = g(σ (a)), where σ(a) is the result of applying σ to each element of
a, av .
2. It is monotone: for every pair x, x ′ ∈ [q]V , if g(x) = a and x ′ ≥a x then g(x ′) = a.
Examples of such functions are the simple plurality function and various recursive plurality
(i.e., electoral college-like) functions. Another important example is the dictator function, in
which g(a) = av , for some fixed v.
The whole process of social interaction and elections can be viewed as a single function
from the original signals {Xv(0)|v ∈ V } to [q]. We denote this function by f : [q]V → [q],
and call it the aggregation function, so that
Y = g(X1(T ), . . . , X |V |(T )) = f (X1(0), . . . , X |V |(0)).
Note that for brevity’s sake we sometimes write the above as Y = f (X). It is easy to see that
the aggregation function f has the same properties we that require from the election system
g: it is monotone and fair.
Finally, the concept of social types is, in the case of monotone dynamics, defined by the
symmetries of the aggregation function, rather than those of the graph. We first define H( f ),
the symmetry group of the aggregation function, as the group of permutations τ on V that
satisfy the following condition: for every a ∈ [q]V it holds that f (τ (a)) = f (a), where
τ(a)v = aτ(v).
It is easy to verify that H( f ) is indeed a group, with composition as the operation: for any
τ, σ ∈ H( f ) it holds that f (τ (σ (a))) = f (σ (a)) = f (a), and hence τσ ∈ H( f ). Also,
f (a) = f (τ (τ−1(a))) = f (τ−1(a)), and so τ−1 is also in H( f ).
The set of Social types is simply V/H( f ), the set of orbits of V under the action of H( f ).
I.e., A( f ) is the unique partition of V such that v,w ∈ V are of the same social type iff
∃τ ∈ H( f ) such that τ(v) = w.
The definition of m(G) now naturally becomes the following. Given an aggregation func-
tion f : [q]V → [q], denote by m( f ) the size of the smallest social type induced by f :
m( f ) = min
A∈A( f ) |A|.
Our main result of this section, which is a strict generalization of that of the previous,
is again that information is aggregated efficiently provided that each social type has many
members. In the case of monotone dynamics, our definition of the efficiency of aggregation
is the following. Let Pδ be the set of probability distributions P on [q] under which P(0) ≥
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P(i) + δ for all i = 1, . . . , q − 1. Then the efficiency μδ( f ) of a function f : [q]n → [q] is
defined by
μδ( f ) = inf
P∈Pδ
P[ f (X) = 0].
Our main result for this section is the following:
Theorem 4.1. Let f : [q]V → [q] be a monotone and fair aggregation function, and let
m = m( f ) be the size of the smallest social type. Then
μδ( f ) ≥ 1 − Cq exp
(
−Cq δ log mlog(1/δ)
)
,
for some Cq that depends only on q.
Theorem 4.1 is a statement about functions f such that m( f ) is large. For q = 2 and odd
n it is easy to find examples of such functions - the majority function, for example. However,
not for every value of q, n and m ≤ n there exists a fair and monotone aggregation function
fq,n such that m = m( fq,n). In particular, it is not clear for which values of q and n there
exists a fair and monotone aggregation function fq,n that is transitive, i.e., m( fq,n) = n.
The challenge is to break ties in a way that preserves fairness and transitivity, and indeed
it seems that no simple, immediate examples exist. We provide the following example of a
fair, transitive and monotone function, for any q ≥ 2 and n prime and larger than q . See
further discussion in N. AhmadiPourAnari, unpublished manuscript, 2011.
Proposition 2.3 For all q ≥ 2 and n prime and strictly larger than q, there exists a monotone,
fair and transitive aggregation function f : [q]n → [q].
2.3 Unanimity results
Besides the question of which candidate would win a majority vote, there are other interesting
events we could study. As an extreme case, we consider the question of eventual unanimity,
the event that everyone converges to the same opinion. Here we consider any number of
alternatives q , but specialize to the case where the mode of interaction is given by simple
plurality. It is easy to construct examples showing that our earlier assumptions on the structure
of the network do not imply that the whole electorate will eventually agree. Indeed, there
could be a small clique of voters who are well-connected to each other but poorly connected
to the rest of the population. These voters could forever maintain an opinion contrary to that
of their peers. One way to avoid this situation is to ask that the social network be an expander
graph.
Let M be the adjacency matrix of a d-regular graph G. We say that G is a λ-expander
graph if the second-largest absolute eigenvalue of M is no larger than λ.
Although we will not require any knowledge of expander graphs here, we refer the unini-
tiated reader to [12] for a survey on the topic. For now, it is enough to know that “good”
expanders have λ = O(√d).
Theorem 2.4 Let Gn be a sequence of d-regularλ-expanders whose size converges to infinity.
Suppose that λd ≤ 316 and
P(0) ≥ P(i) + c
√
log q√
d
(1)
for all i = 0. For v a vertex in Gn let Xv(0) be drawn i.i.d. from P, and let the mode of
interaction be majority dynamics. Then with probability converging to 1 as n → ∞, there
exists a time T such that Xv(T ) = 0 for all v ∈ V .
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The dependency on d in Eq. (1) is possibly not tight. In particular, if q = 2 and the girth
of Gn tends to infinity with n, then a result of Kanoria and Montanari [18] implies that we
can replace
√
d by dα for any α > 0.
2.4 Higher threshold results
As an intermediate step between majority and unanimity, we next consider the event that one
candidate achieves a substantial margin of victory. For q = 2, consider the election system
gn,α(x) = 1(∑i xi ≥ (1 − α)n). When α = 1/2, this is just the simple majority function.
It is monotone and fair, and so Theorem 4.1 applies. When α > 1/2, however, gn,α is no
longer symmetric in the alternatives. We prove that the final bias is as large as the expected
initial bias.
Theorem 2.5 Let fn,α be a monotone aggregation function with election system gn,α on the
graph Gn after running T rounds of interaction. If m( fn,α) → ∞ and α < 12 + δ2 then for
any T ∈ N,
lim
n→∞ μδ( fn,α) = 1.
We remark that the proof of Theorem 2.5 shows that μδ( fn,α) converges to one polyno-
mially fast in m( fn,α).
We do not believe that the relationship between α and δ is the best possible. Note that
for the complete graph on n nodes, one can take α exponentially close to one for any δ. It is
natural to guess that the worst dependence on n occurs in a ring. For this case we show that
one can take α as large as 1 − (1 − δ)2/2 when δ is large, and 12 + 56δ when δ is small. This
example is interesting because it shows that a small initial bias in voters’ opinions can result
in a larger bias by the time the votes are cast. We do not know whether such a phenomenon
exists on a larger class of graphs.
3 Discussion and future directions
In this article we consider the question of aggregation of information in a natural model of
dynamics on a social network. Our main result is that information is well aggregated when
there are no “special” agents; that is, when every agent is equivalent to many others. This is a
rather strong condition of egalitarianism which is easily destroyed by a minor change to the
network (or the election system, in the case of general monotone dynamics). Furthermore,
networks that satisfy this condition are highly structured and unlikely to emerge organi-
cally. Hence, a natural question is whether a weaker condition suffices to ensure efficient
aggregation of information.
All known majority dynamics counterexamples in which aggregation fails involve
sequences of graphs with growing degrees. We therefore propose the following conjecture.
Conjecture 3.1 (Efficient aggregation of information on bounded degree graphs). Let Gn
be a sequence of graphs whose size converges to infinity and whose vertices all have degree
at most d. Then for all δ > 0
lim
n
inf
T
μδ(Gn, T ) = 1.
In the case of two alternatives, almost any reasonable election system is monotone and
fair. However, as indicated by Sect. 5, the universe of functions that are fair and monotone is
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rather restricted when the number of alternatives is greater than two. It would be interesting
to extend this work to, for example, the case that agents “vote” by declaring their order of
preference on all the candidates (rather than just their top choice), and the voting system
is Condorcet compatible, or alternatively satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(see [23] for a complete characterization of the latter class).
4 Aggregation of information
In this section, we will prove the following theorem, using the definitions of Sect. 2.2.
Theorem 4.1 Let f : [q]V → [q] be a monotone and fair aggregation function, and let
m = m( f ) be the size of the smallest social type. Then
μδ( f ) ≥ 1 − Cq exp
(
−Cq δ log mlog(1/δ)
)
,
for some Cq that depends only on q.
The proof of this theorem relies on a “sharp threshold” theorem of Kalai and Mossel [17]
(which is itself an extension of Talagrand’s theorem [26] to the case q > 2). Sharp threshold
theorems go back to Margulis [20] and Russo [24], Friedgut-Kalai [9] and Kalai [15] apply
sharp threshold theorems in contexts similar to this one. In fact, the result of [15] gives
a weaker version of Theorem 4.1 in which each social type must have at least n/o(log n)
members.
A crucial ingredient for sharp threshold results is the notion of influence, which we will
define for a function f : [q]n → {0, 1}. Let P be a probability measure on [q], and denote
also by P the corresponding product distribution over [q]n . The influence of voter i on a
function f : [q]n → {0, 1} is
I iP( f ) = EPVarP( f (X1, . . . , Xn)|X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn), (2)
where VarP is the variance with respect to the product measure P.
Kalai and Mossel [17] prove the following inequality:
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that P(a) ≥ α > 0 for every a ∈ [q]. If maxi I iP( f ) ≤  then
n∑
i=1
I iP( f ) ≥ C log n
log(1/) − log(1/4)
log(1/α)
VarP( f )
for a universal constant C.
Theorem 4.2 is the main technical ingredient in the Proof of Theorem 4.1. The main
contribution of Theorem 4.1 over the applications of Theorem 4.2 which appeared in [17] is
that Theorem 4.1 applies to functions over multiple social types.
Before proving Theorem 4.1 we will require a simple definition and Lemma. Let P be a
probability distribution on [q] such that P(0) > 0. Define the following family of distributions
Px (indexed by x ∈ [0, 1]) as follows:
Px (a) =
{
x a = 0
(1 − x)P(a|a = 0) a > 0.
Note that PP(0) = P.
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Lemma 4.3 Let P be a probability distribution on [q] such that P(0) = P(1) + δ for some
δ > 0. Let y be such that Py(0) = Py(1). Then
P(0) − y ≥ δ/2. (3)
Proof We can solve for y to find that y = (P(0) − δ)/(1 − δ). Hence
P(0) − y = (1 − P(0)) δ
1 − δ ≥ δ/2,
Where the inequality follows from the fact that since P(0) = P(1) + δ ≤ 1 − P(0) + δ, it
holds that 1 − δ ≤ 2 − 2P(0). unionsq
We prove Theorem 4.1 below by calculating the derivative of Px ( f = 0) with respect to
x and then integrating between x = y and x = P(0). We thus interpolate between Py , in
which, by definition, the probability of zero and a are equal, and P (= PP(0)), in which the
probability of zero is larger by δ than the probability of a. This idea goes back to the very
first appearances of sharp threshold theorems [20,24].
For a function g and a probability measure P, we will write P(g) for the expectation of g
under P.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 Since the conclusion of the theorem is only weakened when δ is
reduced, we can assume without loss of generality that there is some i > 0 such that the
inequality P(0) ≥ P(i) + δ is tight; moreover, we may assume that this i is 1, and so
P(1) + δ = P(0). Choose y ∈ [0, P(0)] so that Py(0) = Py(1).
Let g : [q]V → [q] be defined by g = 1( f =0); that is, g(a) = 1 iff f (a) = 0. Suppose
(for now) that P(b) ≥ δ2q for all b ∈ [q], and so Px (b) ≥ δ2q for all s ≤ t ≤ P(0) and
all b ∈ [q]. Since f is fair and monotone, Py(g) ≥ 1/q . Indeed, the event { f = 0} is
monotone with respect to the order ≤0, and for any transposition τ on [q] which swaps 0
with some element i in 1, . . . , q − 1, the measure P stochastically dominates P ◦ τ with
respect to the ordering ≤0. Hence, P( f = 0) ≥ (P ◦ τ)( f = 0) which, by the fairness
of f , is equal to P( f = τ(0)) = P( f = i). Since ∑q−1i=0 P( f = i) = 1, it follows that
P(g) = P( f = 0) ≥ 1/q . Using monotonicity again, Px (g) ≥ 1/q for all x ≥ y.
By Theorem 4.2, if x := maxi∈[n] I iPx (g) then
n∑
i=1
I iPx (g) ≥
C log(1/x )
log(2q/δ)
VarPx (g) ≥
C log(1/x )
q log(2q/δ)
Px (1 − g)
for all x ∈ [y, P(0)]. Now, recall that for A ∈ A, if i, j ∈ A then they play the same role in
f and in particular have the same influence. Hence ∑i=1 I iPx (g) ≥ mx , since |A| ≥ m for
any A ∈ A. In particular, if x ≥ (log m)/m then ∑i I iPx (g) ≥ log m; on the other hand, if
x ≤ (log m)/m then the display above implies that
∑
i
I iPx (g) ≥ Cq
log m
log(1/δ)
Px (1 − g), (4)
for some Cq that depends only on q . This last inequality (Eq. 4) holds, therefore, in either
case.
On the other hand, Lemma 2.3 of [17] (a generalization of Russo’s formula) gives
∂Px (g)
∂t
≥
∑
i
I iPx (g)
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and so
∂Px (g)
∂t
≥ Cq log mlog(1/δ)Px (1 − g)
for all x ∈ [y, P(0)]. Integrating between y and x , we have
Px (g) ≥ 1 − (1 − 1/q) exp
(
−Cq log mlog(1/δ) (t − s)
)
and so we conclude by setting x = P(0) and invoking Eq. (3).
Now, if the hypothesis P(b) ≥ δ2q fails then we construct P˜ by P˜(0) = P(0) − δ/4 and
P˜(b) = P(b) + δ4(q−1) for b = 0. Setting δ˜ = δ/2, we see that P˜ satisfies the hypothesis of
the theorem (with δ replaced by δ˜) and it also satisfies P˜(b) ≥ δ˜2q . The proof goes through,
then, and we can absorb the extra factor of 4 into the constant Cq . unionsq
4.1 Where aggregation fails
Let q = 2 and suppose that both the interaction mode and the election system are given by
simple majority votes. In this scenario, we prove Theorem 2.2 by giving an example with
two social types, one of which has a constant size as n → ∞. Information will not aggregate
asymptotically in this example, and the reason for the failure will be the presence of the
constant-sized social type. Note that an example given by Berger [4] can be used to prove
the same result. We give our example since it is simpler and provides additional intuition as
to why aggregation fails.
Since q = 2, it will be more convenient to set p = 12 + δ2 = P(0) and to write our example
in terms of p instead of in terms of δ. Let Gn = (A ∪ B, E), where |A| = 1/(1 − p) and
|B| = n(1/(1 − p) + 1). Then in particular the number of vertices in Gn is at least n. We
assume here that 1/(1 − p) is an integer.
Let each a ∈ A be connected to each b ∈ B, and let none of the vertices in A be connected
to each other. The vertices in B are arranged in n cliques, each of size 1/(1 − p) + 1, and
there are no edges between the cliques. Each vertex in B has a self-loop.
The degree of the vertices in B is odd, since each has edges to 2/(1 − p) + 1 nodes. To
make the degrees in A odd add a vertex that is connected to all vertices in A. An isolated
vertex can be added to make the total number of vertices odd.
Henceforth we condition on the event that Xv(0) = 1 for all v ∈ A. Note that this happens
with probability (1 − p)|A| = (1 − p)1/(1−p).
Let C be one of the cliques of B. If at least one vertex w in C votes 1 initially (at time
t = 0) then all the vertices in C will vote 1 in the next round (t = 1); each will have at least
1/(1− p)+1 neighbors ({w}∪ A) that vote 1 and at most 1/(1− p) neighbors (B \{w}) that
vote 0. The probability that at least one vertex in C votes 1 initially is 1 − p1/(1−p), which
is greater than 1 − 1/e, or about 0.63. Hence the number of cliques in which all vertices
will vote 1 at time one will be distributed Binom
(
n, 1 − p1/(1−p)), which dominates the
distribution Binom (n, 0.6).
By Hoeffding’s inequality, the probability that a majority of the cliques (and hence a
majority of the vertices) will vote 1 at time one is at least 1 − exp(−0.02n). Once this
happens, the vertices in A will all vote 1 in all future iterations, and so will these cliques.
Hence for all T ≥ 2 a majority vote will result in one.
The event that a majority of the cliques have a voter that initially votes 1 is independent
of the event that all vertices in A initially vote 1. Hence both events happen with probability
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at least (1 − p)1/(1−p)(1 − exp(−0.02)). Since this quantity is positive and independent of
n, it follows that information does not aggregate and Theorem 2.2 is proved.
Berger [4] constructs an example of a family of graphs with n vertices. In each graph
there exists a set of at most 18 vertices (which he calls a dynamic monopoly), such that if all
agents in this set initially vote identically then, in majority dynamics with two alternatives,
all the agents converge to the initial vote of the dynamic monopoly. In particular, this implies
that in this example, with probability at least (1 − p)18, aggregation fails for any n. This is
another example of how aggregation can fail when a particular social type has a small size
(in this case at most 18).
5 The existence of monotone, fair and transitive aggregation functions
Proposition 5.1 For all q ≥ 2 and n prime and strictly larger than q, there exists a monotone,
fair and transitive aggregation function f : [q]n → [q].
Proof Let q ≥ 2 and let n > q be prime. Let f : [q]n → [q] be defined as follows.
For a = (a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ [q]n let Q(a) be the set of alternatives that received the most
votes. If Q(a) = {b} is a singleton then let f (a) = b. Otherwise |Q(a)| ≥ 2. Let M(a) ⊂ [n]
be the set of voters that voted for one of the alternatives in Q(a). Note that |M(a)| = n,
since otherwise each alternative received the same number of votes and so |Q(a)| divides n,
which is impossible since n is prime. Also, M(a) is clearly not the empty set, and so |M(a)|
is an invertible element of the field Zn . Let
k(a) = 1|M(a)|
∑
i∈M(a)
i = 1|M(a)|
∑
ai ∈Q(a)
i
where addition and division are taken over the field Zn . Note that k(a) is the “average”
position of a voter that voted for one of the votes that received the most votes. Let
	(a) = min {0 ≤ i < n : k(a) + i ∈ M(a)},
where again the sum k(a) + i is taken over Zn . Finally, define
f (a) = ak(a)+	(a).
By definition f (a) ∈ Q(a), and so f is the plurality function with some tie breaking
rule, and is therefore monotone. Also, none of the alternative names appear in its definition,
and it is therefore fair. It remains to show that it is transitive. We do this by showing that for
each 0 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 < n there exists a permutation τ = τi1,i2 on [n] such that τ(i1) = i2 and
f (τ (a)) = f (a), where τ(a) = (aτ(0), . . . , aτ(n−1)).
Let τi1,i2(i) = τ(i) = i − i1 + i2 mod n. Note that Q(τ (a)) = Q(a) and that M(τ (a)) =
τ−1(M(a)), so that |M(τ (a))| = |M(a)|. Hence
k(τ (a)) = 1|M(τ (a))|
∑
i∈M(τ (a))
i
= 1|M(a)|
∑
i∈τ−1(M(a))
i.
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By a change of variables we get that
k(τ (a)) = 1|M(a)|
∑
i∈M(a)
τ−1(i)
= k(a) + i1 − i2
= τ−1(k(a))
Next,
	(τ(a)) = min{0 ≤ i < n : k(τ (a)) + i ∈ M(τ (a))}
= min{0 ≤ i < n : k(a) + i1 − i2 + i ∈ M(a) + i1 − i2}
= 	(a),
and finally, since τ(i + j) = τ(i) + j :
f (τ (a)) = a
τ
(
k(τ (a))+	(τ (a))
)
= a
τ
(
k(τ (a))
)
+	(a)
= ak(a)+	(a) = f (a).
unionsq
6 On higher thresholds of agreement
In this section we again specialize to the case of q = 2 alternatives, and consider the question
of when it can be shown that, after a number of rounds of fair and monotone dynamics, a
large proportion of the population will agree on the correct alternative.
Consider the election system gn,α(x) = 1(∑i xi ≥ (1 − α)n). When α = 1/2, this is
simply the majority function, and so our earlier results apply, and under the appropriate
conditions Y = g(X1(T ), . . . , X |V |(T )) will equal zero with high probability. What about
when α > 1/2? In this case Y will equal zero only if an α fraction of the population votes
zero at time T . When does this happen with high probability?
Since gn,α satisfies the same transitivity properties as gn,1/2, the proof of Theorem 4.1
mostly still applies. At least, the “sharp threshold” part of the claim is still true: there is some
p∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that P(0) > p∗ implies that P(Y = 0) →m( fn) 1. Since gn,α is no longer
anti-symmetric, however, we no longer know that the threshold occurs at p∗ = 1/2.
In this section, we will show that p∗ ≤ α, but we will also give a simple example for
which p∗ = 1 − O((1 − α)2) as α → 1. Thus, there may be a large gap between our bound
and the true behavior of p∗.
The first step is to obtain a lower bound on E
∑
i Xv(t). The argument here appeared in a
course taught by the first author in Fall 2010, although it may have been known before then.
In any case, we give a proof for completeness. For the rest of this section, Pp denotes the
probability distribution on {0, 1} satisfying Pp(0) = p, in which case δ = 2p −1. As above,
we also denote by Pp the distribution over n i.i.d. random variables distributed Pp .
Lemma 6.1 Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a monotone function with P1/2( f = 0) ≥ 12 . Then
Pp( f = 0) ≥ p for all p ∈ [ 12 , 1].
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Note that equality holds for the function f (x) = xi . In other words, every monotone
function aggregates information at least as well as a dictator function. It is easy to construct
less pathological examples that come arbitrarily close to achieving this bound.
Proof By the chain rule,
∂Pp( f )
∂p
=
n∑
i=1
Pp( f (X1, . . . , Xi−1, 0, Xi+1, . . . , Xn)
− f (X1, . . . , Xi−1, 1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn))
= − 1
p(1 − p)
n∑
i=1
I iPp ( f ).
By the Efron–Stein inequality [7], ∑ I i ( f ) ≥ Var( f ), with equality only if f depends just
on one coordinate. If f depends just on one coordinate, then the proof is trivial, so we can
suppose the contrary. Thus ∂
∂p Pp( f ) < − 1p(1−p)VarPp ( f ).
Suppose, for a contradiction, that 1 − Pp( f ) = Pp( f = 0) < p for some p > 12 . Let r
be the infinum over all p satisfying the previous sentence. Since Pp( f ) is a smooth function
of p, it follows that Pr ( f ) = 1 − r and so VarPr ( f ) = r(1 − r). Thus, ∂∂p Pp( f )|p=r < −1,
contradicting the assumption that Pp( f ) > 1 − p for arbitrarily close p > r . unionsq
Note that for any vertex v and any t , the conditions of the lemma hold for f = Xv(t).
Summing over all v, we obtain the following:
Corollary 6.2 Suppose that Xv(0) are independent Bernoulli variables with mean p ≥ 12 .
Then, for any t,
E
∑
v∈V
Xv(t) ≤ (1 − p)|V |.
Combining this with the proof of Theorem 4.1, we arrive at the promised bound on the
location of the sharp threshold. By taking m → ∞, Corollary 6.3 immediately implies
Theorem 2.5.
Corollary 6.3 Let fn : [q]n → q be a sequence of aggregation functions with monotone
and fair modes of interaction and election system gn,α as defined above. Suppose that
limn→∞ m( fn) = ∞, and that p > α. Then Pp(Y = 0) ≥ 1 − m−C2 for some universal
constant C.
Proof For the sake of brevity, denote gn, = gn,(X1(T ), . . . , X |V |(T )) (which equals Y for
 = α). From the proof of Theorem 4.1, we have
∂Pp(gn,α = 0)
∂p
≥ C(log m)VarPp (gn,α).
On the other hand, Corollary 6.2 gives us that for any  > 0
Pp(gn,p− = 0) = Pp
(∑
v∈V
Xv(t) ≤ (1 − p + )|V |
)
≥ 
and so VarPp (gn,p−) ≥ Pp(gn,p−) for any .
Fix α < p and set  = (p −α)/2. Then for any r ∈ [α + , p], VarPr (gn,α) ≥ Pr (gn,α)
and so we can solve the differential inequality
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∂Pr (gn,α = 0)
∂r
≥ C(log m)Pr (gn,α)
in the range [p − , p], with initial condition Pp−(gn,α = 0) ≥ . We obtain
Pp(Y = 0) = Pp(gn,α = 0) ≥ 1 − (1 − ) exp
(−C2 log m)) ≥ 1 − exp(−C2 log m).
unionsq
6.1 An example: cycles
Let Gn be a cycle on n vertices, where each vertex has a self-loop, and recall that p =
1+δ
2 . When the mode of interaction is majority dynamics, we can explicitly calculate the
distribution of limt→∞ Xv(t). We study voter aggregation on cycles for two reasons. Firstly,
we obtain more precise answers than the general bound (Theorem 2.5) on higher thresholds,
thereby demonstrating that Theorem 2.5 may not be sharp; specifically, we find that for
cycles, μδ( fn,α) → 1 for a larger range of α than those guaranteed to work by Theorem 2.5.
Secondly, cycles are a natural example to study because they are in some sense the most
poorly-connected transitive graphs. It is therefore natural to conjecture that cycles are the
worst-performing graphs for higher thresholds, suggesting that perhaps Theorem 2.5 could
be improved in general.
Of particular interest are the cases when δ → 0 or δ → 1; for small δ, α < 12 + 56δ−
(δ3)
turns out to imply limn→∞ μδ( fn,α) → 1, while for large δ, if we set  = 1 − δ, then
α < 1 − 122 is sufficient. Therefore, the bound in Theorem 2.5 is not tight: for δ close to
zero, one can take α ≈ 12 + 56δ while Theorem 2.5 only guarantees that α = 12 + 12 δ will
work; for δ close to 1, α ≈ 1 − 122 is sufficient, but Theorem 2.5 only allows α = 1 − 12.
The analysis of the cycle is relatively simple because the eventual state of the voters can
be easily foretold from the initial state. First of all, whenever two (or more) adjacent voters
share the same opinion, they will retain that opinion forever. Moreover, strings of voters
whose opinions alternate will gradually turn into strings of voters with the same opinion, as
in the following example:
time t · · · 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 · · ·
time t + 1 · · · 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 · · ·
time t + 2 · · · 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 · · ·
In fact, one can tell the eventual opinion of a voter v with the following simple rule: let
V ≥ 0 be the smallest number such that Xv−V = Xv−V−1 and let W ≥ 0 be the smallest
number such that Xv+W = Xv+W+1 (assuming that such V and W exist, which will only fail
to happen in the unlikely event that the whole cycle consists of alternating opinions). If V ≤ W
then Xv(t) = Xv−V (0) for all t ≥ V . On the other hand, if W ≤ V then Xv(t) = Xv+W (0)
for all t ≥ W . (If V = W then Xv−V (0) = Xv+W (0) because Xv−V (0) = Xv(0) if and only
if V is even, and similarly for W .)
Proposition 6.4 Let G be the cycle on n vertices. Then for any v,
lim
T→∞ limn→∞ P(Xv(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T ) =
2p2 − p3
1 − p + p2 =
1
2
+ 5δ − δ
3
6 + 2δ2 = 1 −
42 − 3
8 − 4 + 22 .
As we observed following Corollary 6.2, this implies that if α < 12 + 5δ−δ
3
6+2δ2 and the number
of interaction rounds is sufficiently large (depending on α and p), then μδ( fn,α) → 1.
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Proof For brevity, we will write Xv instead of Xv(0) for the initial state of vertex v. Instead
of majority dynamics on the cycle, consider majority dynamics on Z; we will see later that
these are essentially the same when n is large. We may assume without loss of generality
that v = 0. As in the discussion above, let V ≥ 0 be minimal such that X−V = X−V−1 and
let W ≥ 0 be minimal such that XW = XW+1.
Let us first condition on X0(0) = 0. Consider the i.i.d. sequence
Yk = (X−2k, X1−2k, X2k−1, X2k) ∈ {0, 1}4.
If Y1, . . . , Y j = (0, 1, 1, 0) then the sequence X−2 j , . . . , X2 j consists of alternating zeros
and ones, and so V, W ≥ 2 j . Define A0, A1 ⊂ {0, 1}4 by
A0 =
{
(a, b, c, d) : b = 0 or c = 0}
A1 =
{
(a, b, c, d) : a = b = c = 1 or b = c = d = 1}
Note that A0 ∩ A1 = ∅ and {0, 1}4 \ (A0 ∪ A1) = {(0, 1, 1, 0)}. Therefore, if J is minimal
such that YJ = (0, 1, 1, 0) then YJ is in either A0 or A1. If YJ ∈ A0 then either W = 2J − 2
and XW = 0:
X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 · · · X2J−3 X2J−2 X2J−1
0 1 0 1 0 · · · 1 0 0
or V = 2J − 2 and X−V = 0:
X−(2J−1) X−(2J−2) X−(2J−3) · · · X−4 X−3 X−2 X−1 X0
0 0 1 · · · 0 1 0 1 0
In either of these cases, X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 2J − 2. Conversely, if YJ ∈ A1 then either
XW = 1 or XV = 1 and X0(t) = 1 for all t ≥ 2J − 1. Thus, (using the fact that J and YJ
are independent)
P(X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T |X0 = 0) = P(YJ ∈ A0)P(2J − 2 ≤ T ). (5)
Since the Y j are i.i.d,
P(YJ ∈ A0) = P(Y1 ∈ A0)P(Y1 ∈ A0 ∪ A1)
= 2p − p
2
2p − p2 + 2(1 − p)3 − (1 − p)4
= 2p − p
2
1 − p2 + 2p3 − p4 , (6)
where we have computed P(Y1 ∈ Ai ) by the inclusion/exclusion formulas
P(Y1 ∈ A0) = P(X−1 = 0) + P(X1 = 0) − P(X−1 = X1 = 0)
P(Y1 ∈ A1) = P(X−2 = X−1 = X1 = 1) + P(X−1 = X1 = X2 = 1)
−P(X−2 = · · · = X2 = 1).
The case for X0 = 1 is similar: we define
A′0 = {(a, b, c, d) : a = b = c = 0 or b = c = d = 0}
A′1 = {(a, b, c, d) : b = 1 or c = 1}.
123
Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst (2014) 28:408–429 425
If J ′ is minimal such that YJ ′ = (1, 0, 0, 1) then YJ ′ ∈ A′0 implies X0(t) = 0 for t ≥ 2J ′−1,
while YJ ′ ∈ A′1 implies X0(t) → 1 for t ≥ 2J ′ − 2. Since P(Y1 ∈ A′0) = 2p3 − p4 and
P(Y1 ∈ A′1) = 2(1 − p) − (1 − p)2, we have
P(X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T |X0 = 1)
P(2J − 1 ≤ T ) =
P(Y1 ∈ A′0)
P(Y1 ∈ A′0 ∩ A′1)
= 2p
3 − p4
1 − p2 + 2p3 − p4 . (7)
To transition back from dynamics on Z to dynamics on the n-cycle, note that the event
{X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T } is the same event on Z and on the n-cycle, provided that n > 2T .
In particular, (5) and (6) imply that
lim
n→∞ P(X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T |X0 = 0) = P(2J − 2 ≤ T )
2p − p2
1 − p2 + 2p3 − p4
for majority dynamics on the n-cycle (and similarly conditioned on X0 = 1, using (7). Since
limT→∞ P(2J − 2 ≤ T ) = 1,
lim
T→∞ limn→∞ P(X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T |X0 = 0) =
2p − p2
1 − p2 + 2p3 − p4 .
(and similarly conditioned on X0 = 1). Finally,
P(X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T ) = pP(X0(t) = 0 for all t ≥ T |X0 = 0) + (1 − p)P(X0(t)
= 0 for all t ≥ T |X0 = 1) → 2p
2 − p3
1 − p + p2
as T, n → ∞. The formulas in terms of δ and  are obtained by substituting p = 1+δ2 = 1− 2 .unionsq
7 Expander graphs converge to unanimity
7.1 Majority dynamics with two alternatives
In this section we again consider the case that q = 2 and majority dynamics (i.e., each voter
adopts the majority opinion of its neighbors), with a population wide majority vote at time
T . To avoid the issue of ties, we assume that |Nv| is odd for all v and that n is odd.
Let G be a graph and M its adjacency matrix, so that Mvu is 1 if (u, v) ∈ E and zero
otherwise. We say that G is a λ-expander if the second-largest absolute eigenvalue of M
is at most λ (cf. [12]). Expander graphs have particularly nice properties under the iterated
majority dynamics. One reason for this is that in an expander graph, the number of edges
between disjoint sets A and B of vertices is almost completely determined by the cardinalities
of A and B. We state this formally in Lemma 7.1 below.
Denote E(A, B) = 1TA M1B , where A and B be sets of vertices. Note that if A and B
are disjoint then E(A, B) is the number of edges between A and B, and if A and B are not
disjoint, then E(A, B) double-counts edges from A ∩ B to itself. Alternatively, E(A, B) is
the number of “edge-ends” of edges with one end in A and another in B.
Recall that a graph is d-regular if all vertices have degree d , i.e., |Nv| = d for all v ∈ V .
Lemma 7.1 (Expander mixing lemma (cf. [1])) If G is a d-regular λ-expander with n vertices
then ∣∣∣E(A, B) − |A||B|d
n
∣∣∣ ≤ λ√|A||B|
for every A, B ⊂ G.
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It follows easily from the expander mixing lemma that medium-sized majorities are unsta-
ble under iterated majority dynamics. That is, if a reasonable majority of people prefer one
outcome then very quickly a large majority of people will prefer that outcome.
Proposition 7.2 Let q = 2, let n be odd, let G be a d-regular λ-expander with d odd, and
let the mode of interaction be majority dynamics with a majority vote at time T .
Let N0(t) be the number of agents that vote 0 at time t and let N1(t) be the number of
agents that vote 1. If N0(t) ≥ N1(t) + αn then N1(t + 1) ≤ 2λ2α2d2 n.
Proof Let A0(t) be the set of agents that vote 0 at time t , and define A1(t) similarly. Then,
by the nature of majority dynamics, every v ∈ A1(t + 1) has more than half of its neighbors
in A1(t). Summing over every v ∈ A1(t + 1), we have E(A1(t + 1), A1(t)) ≥ E(A1(t +
1), A0(t)). By applying the expander mixing lemma to both sides,
N1(t + 1)N0(t)d
n
− λ√N1(t + 1)N0(t) ≤ N1(t + 1)N1(t)d
n
+ λ√N1(t + 1)N1(t).
Rearranging, and since N0(t) − N1(t) ≥ αn,
α
√
N1(t + 1) ≤ λd (
√
N1(t) +
√
N0(t)) ≤ λd
√
2n.
unionsq
Applying the proposition twice, we see that an imbalance of 4λnd implies that a large,
stable majority will form within one time-step.
Corollary 7.3 If N0(t) ≥ N1(t) + 4λnd and λd ≤ 316 then N1(s) ≤ n8 for all s ≥ t + 1.
Proof Taking α = 4λd in Proposition 7.2, we have N1(t + 1) ≤ n8 . Then N0(t + 1) ≥
N1(t + 1) + 3n4 ≥ 4λnd and so we can continue applying Proposition 7.2 indefinitely with
α = 4λd . unionsq
In order to show that a complete consensus is eventually achieved, we will use a result
of [10], who proved that majority dynamics will eventually enter a cycle with period at most
two.
Proposition 7.4 If λd ≤ 316 and N0(t) − N1(t) ≥ 4λnd for some t, then majority dynamics
converge to all zero.
Proof Since majority dynamics converge to a cycle with period at most two, we can divide
the vertices of G into four sets: A00 is the set of nodes that converge to 0, A11 is the set
that converge to one, with A01 and A10 being the two sets of nodes that eventually alternate
between zero and one. By Corollary 7.3, |A11| + max{|A01|, |A10|} ≤ n8 , and so |Ac00| =|A11| + |A01| + |A10| ≤ n4 . By the expander mixing lemma,
|E(Ac00, Ac00)| ≤ |Ac00|2
d
n
+ λ|Ac00| ≤ |Ac00|
(
d
4
+ λ
)
.
On the other hand, |E(A00, Ac00)| + |E(Ac00, Ac00)| = d|Ac00| and so |E(A00, Ac00)| ≥
|Ac00|( 3d4 − λ). Since λ ≤ d/4, |E(A00, Ac00)| ≥ d2 |Ac00|. Supposing that Ac00 is non-empty,
there must be at least one vertex v ∈ Ac00 with more than half of its neighbors in A00. But then
the definition of majority dynamics would imply that v converges to zero, a contradiction.
Thus Ac00 must be empty, and all agents converge to zero. unionsq
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In particular, a random d-regular graph has λ = O(√d) with high probability. Therefore,
if we start with an initial bias such that P(0)− 12  d−1/2 then iterated majority on a random
d-regular graph will converge to all zero with high probability.
7.2 Plurality dynamics on expanders
The results of the previous section can be extended with little effort to the case of more than
two alternatives. The main obstacle in making this extension is specifying the resolution of
ties. With two alternatives, we avoid the possibility of ties in majority dynamics simply by
requiring each vertex to have odd degree. With more than two alternatives, the simplest way to
avoid ties is to perturb the edge weights slightly so that they are rationally independent.2 Our
expansion assumptions can be easily extended to the weighted case: let M be the weighted
adjacency matrix of G and assume that all of its entries on or above the main diagonal are
rationally independent of one another. Let d be the largest absolute eigenvalue of M and let
λ be the second-largest. Note that if M was constructed by perturbing the edge weights of
a random regular graph, then d will be approximately the degree of the graph and λ will be
O(
√
d).
With the assumptions above, Lemma 7.1 holds exactly as it was stated above, and so the
proof of Proposition 7.2 applies also.
Proposition 7.5 For a ∈ [q], let Na(t) be the number of people that vote a at time t. If
Na(t) ≥ 1+α2 n then Na(t + 1) ≥ n(1 − 2λ
2
α2d2 )
To get an extension of Proposition 7.4, we first need to extend the periodicity result [10]
to the case of several alternatives. This extension uses exactly the same argument as [10], but
we include it for completeness.
Proposition 7.6 On a weighted graph with no ties, iterated plurality dynamics converge to
a cycle of length at most two.
Proof Consider the quantity
Jv(t) =
∑
a∈[q]
((
1{Xv(t+1)=a} − 1{Xv(t−1)=a}
) ∑
w∼v
ewv1{Xw(t)=a}
)
,
where ewv is the weight of the edge between v and w. Note that Jv(t) ≥ 0 with equality
if, and only if, Xv(t + 1) = Xv(t − 1). Indeed, if Xv(t + 1) = Xv(t − 1) then Jv(t) = 0
trivially, so suppose that Xv(t + 1) = a and Xv(t − 1) = b = a. Then
Jv(t) =
∑
{w∼v:Xw(t)=a}
ewv −
∑
{w∼v:Xw(t)=b}
ewv.
Since Xv(t + 1) = a and the edge weights are chosen to ensure that ties never happen, this
implies that Jv(t) > 0.
Now consider J (t) = ∑v Jv(t). Note that if we define
L(t) =
∑
v
∑
w∼v
∑
a∈[q]
ewv1{Xv(t+1)=a}1{Xw(t)=a}
2 A finite set of real numbers {x1, . . . , xn} is rationally independent if for rational {a1, . . . , an},
∑
i ai xi = 0
implies that the ai ’s are all equal to zero.
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then J (t) = L(t)− L(t −1). Since the state space of the dynamics is finite and the dynamics
are deterministic, the process eventually (by time T , say) converges to a cycle (of period k,
say). Then
T+k∑
t=T+1
J (t) =
T+k∑
t=T+1
L(t) −
T+k−1∑
t=T
L(t) = 0,
since the states are identical at time T and T +k, and thus L(T ) = L(T +k). Since J (t) ≥ 0
for every t , it follows that J (T + 1) = 0. Then Jv(T + 1) = 0 for every v and so the state
at time T + 2 is identical to the state at time T . unionsq
With Proposition 7.6 in hand, the rest of the proof of Proposition 7.4 goes through in the
q-alternative case. We only note that we need to replace A01 by the set Aa∗ = {v : Xv(2t) =
a = Xv(2t + 1) for large enough t}.
Proposition 7.7 If λd ≤ 316 and Na(t) ≥ n( 12 + 2λd ) for some t then the plurality dynamics
converge to a.
In particular, if we take a random d-regular graph and perturb each edge weight by at
most n−3, then the second eigenvalue will hardly change, so we will still have λ = O(√d).
If P(Xv(0) = a) ≥ P(Xv(0) = b) + c
√
log q√
d for every b = a then at time t = 1, with high
probability most of the vertices will prefer a and Proposition 7.7 will imply that the plurality
dynamics will converge to all a.
7.3 A stronger result for expanders with large girth
In Sect. 7.1 we proved that in majority dynamics with two alternatives, an initial bias of
d−1/2 is sufficient (on a random d-regular graph) for consensus in the limit. Kanoria and
Montanari [18] showed that on an infinite d-regular tree, the required bias is much smaller
as a function of d:
Theorem 7.8 (Kanoria and Montanari) Let v be a vertex in an infinite d-regular tree. For any
β > 0 and all sufficiently large d, if P(0) ≥ 12 + d−β then with probability one, Xv(t) = 0for all sufficiently large t.
Using this, it is easy to improve our earlier bias requirement for consensus from P(0)− 12 
d−1/2 to P(0) − 12  d−β for any β > 0:
Corollary 7.9 For every d, let Gn,d be a sequence of d-regular λ-expanders with λd ≤ 316 ,
such that the girth of Gn,d tends to infinity with n. For any β > 0, if p ≥ 12 + d−β then for
all sufficiently large d, with high probability (as n → ∞) the iterated majority process on
Gn,d will converge to all zero.
Proof Choose d large enough (depending on β) so that Theorem 7.8 applies, then choose T
large enough so that P(Xv(T ) = 0) ≥ 12 + C√d on the d-regular tree, for some constant C
to be determined. By choosing n large enough, we can ensure that the girth of Gn,d is larger
than T ; thus P(Xv(T ) = 0) ≥ 12 + C√d for every v ∈ Gn,d . Then the expected fraction of
nodes that are 0 by time T is at least 12 + C√d , since at time T each node only depends on the
initial values of nodes within a ball of radius T . Since the number of such nodes is bounded
as n → ∞, McDiarmid’s inequality [21] implies that with high probability, at least 12 + C−1√d
fraction of nodes are zero at time T . If we choose C large enough, Proposition 7.4 implies
that the dynamics converge to all zero. unionsq
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